The recent declarations by Nasrallah, Ahmadinejad and Assad mark a noticeable decrease in the levels of bellicosity and belligerence in comparison to their erstwhile discourse. Indeed, none of these men has backed down from his declared stands on the all too important issues of resistance and the nuclear capabilities, but their statements did, nonetheless, contain some startling reversals of recent positions and attitudes.
For when Ahmadinejad declares that Iran does not pose a threat "to anybody, not even to the Zionist regime," a mere few weeks after he had called for its destruction, one really has to wonder as to the real significance of this apparent contradiction. Is it only meant to buy time, or has the Mullah establishment opted to adopt a softer more pragmatic stand vis-à-vis the Zionist entity, on the basis of their own assessment of the results of Hezbollah War?
And when Nasrallah himself declares that he would not have ordered the capture of the two Israeli soldiers had he known that the Israeli response would be so destructive, that the South will not witness any manifest sign of militarism while the Lebanese army is there, and that Hezbollah is not preparing for new showdown with the Israelis, this definitely marks an important acknowledgement of the changing realities in Lebanon as a result of the recent “victory.”
And seeing that Bashar had already attempted to back down from his recent dismissal and assault on Arab leaders, one really cannot ignore the emerging pattern here. The key figures in the Resistance Alliance are clearly acting in unison and in accordance with a clearly laid out strategy drawn by the Iranians.
The Alliance is moving to capitalize on its perceived victory by trying to sound more soft, reasonable and pragmatic and, hence, appealing, to some segments of the policy-making community in each one of the key countries involved in the current crisis, especially the United States. The move is designed, naturally, to buy time, enough time, two to three more years to be specific, to produce that first bomb, to conduct that first test, and to change the entire dynamics of the situation and allow for the final emergence of a full-fledged regional power, complete with satellite states and all, that has literally and figuratively been dying to do so ever since that blessed revolution of ’79, if not really before, after all, the Shah had had his regional dreams and ambitions too.
Will the world allow for this emergence to take place, or will it seek to delay or even abort it once and for all? The next few weeks might carry a semblance of an answer. But for now, the momentum seems to be on the side of the Alliance.
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We have just reactivated the "Virtual Syria" (Arabic) blog on the Tharwa Community, and just launched the "Whereto, Syria?" (Arabic and English) blog.
